www.newsandletters.org
|
|
NEWS & LETTERS,
January-February 2003
Venezuelan crisis
The so-called "civic strike" carried out by
Venezuela's elite since Dec. 2, which had paralyzed the all-important state oil
monopoly PDVSA, has had a devastating impact on the country, without bringing
about its intended result of forcing Hugo Chavez from power. By the end of January both the opposition and Chavez
asserted that oil output had risen to about 500,000 barrels a day (bpd), only
20% of normal output, after having fallen to 35,000 bpd the month before. None of these figures however are certain: PDVSA, which
up until two months ago was a world class producer of crude, is in shambles. Two
thousand upper and mid-level employees have been fired by Chavez; its main
computer system isn't functioning, and it's unknown how long it will take to get
many oil fields producing again. At one point in December, 13 of its 21 tankers were
anchored by their captains in support of the strike until they were boarded by
the National Guard. Venezuela's finance minister Tobias Nobrega has already
changed his forecast for the country's growth in 2003 from 3.7% to 0%. The
currency, the bolivar, has supposedly lost a third of its value since the strike
began, and shortages of food and basic consumer goods are becoming more serious. This is occuring despite the fact that the poor, who
make up 80% of the population of 24 million, have opposed the strike, marched in
support of Chavez, and engaged in pitched battles in the streets with middle and
upper class opponents that have left several dead and many dozens wounded. Despite the suffering the strike has caused, initiated
by the elite with the sole aim of forcing out a popularly elected president they
despise, the Bush administration is again maneuvering to lend them a hand.
Having suffered the embarrassment in April last year of supporting a doomed
coup, hardly a peep came from Washington in the first 11 days of the strike. Then, apparently no longer able to keep quiet, it was
declared that the best thing for Venezuela would be early elections, which is
exactly what the opposition wants. Two days later they were backpeddling when it
was pointed out that not a single country in the hemisphere supports removing
Chavez if it means subverting the constitution. The solution? As of the third week of January, the U.S.
began pushing for a constitutional amendment in order to provide for elections.
The fact that a tiny minority in Venezuela could care less if they destroy their
own country in their mad rush to oust Chavez, coupled with the U.S. trying to
find a way to help them, has many leftists calling for his support. Hugo Chavez
is supposed to represent, after all, a point man in the "leftist
resurgence" taking place in Latin America. A key question, however, has been left out of most
discussions of the crisis: how could it be that just eight months after hundreds
of thousands of the poor came into the streets in April last year to reinstall
Chavez two days after the coup, the opposition feels that they can now disregard
that power? Do they sense that the support for Chavez is little more than skin
deep? There is indeed a gulf that separates Chavez from the
poor. Despite the fact that many demonstrations in support of him have taken
place since the strike began, most are organized by the government. The most radical pro-Chavez organizational form that
exists are the so-called "Bolivarian circles," neighborhood groups of
10 to 12 people formed to petition the government for scarce funds. These too
are organized by the government. The "general guidelines" that direct
their formation even state clearly that "the supreme leader of the circulos
bolivarianos will be the President of the Republic." Under these
circumstances it's not hard to see where Chavez's opponents get their
confidence. --Mitch Weerth |
|
Home l News & Letters Newspaper l Back issues l News and Letters Committees l Dialogues l Raya Dunayevskaya l Contact us l Search Published by News and Letters Committees |
