Published:
First published (facsimile) in 1930 in Grazhdanskaya voina. 1918–21, Vol. III.
Printed from the original.
Source:
Lenin
Collected Works,
Progress Publishers,
[1976],
Moscow,
Volume 35,
page 442.
Translated: Andrew Rothstein
Transcription\Markup:
R. Cymbala
Public Domain:
Lenin Internet Archive.
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• README
March 15, 1920
Comrade Sklyansky,
A decision of the R.M.C. is required:
to turn particular attention to the mistake that has obviously been made with the Crimea (sufficient forces were not moved in time)[1];
—all efforts should be exerted to correct the mistake (events in Germany[2] render extremely acute the question of hastening Denikin’s final defeat);
—in particular, prepare naval equipment (mines, submarines, etc.) and a possible advance from Taman into the Crimea (I seem to remember that Mikhail Dmitriyevich Bonch-Bruyevich told me this would be easy).
A number of most precise and most energetic decisions by the R.M.C. on this are essential immediately.
Send me a copy.
[1] The task of taking the Crimea, where the remnants of Denikin’s defeated army under the command of General Y. A. Slashchov had taken refuge, was given to the 13th Army of the South– Western Front. In January 1920, only the 46th Division of this army engaged Slashchov’s forces, but it was unable to break through into the Crimea. Fresh attempts to take the Crimea in February and the first half of March 1920 wore also unsuccessful.
[2] Reference is to the events in Germany following the so-called “Kapp putsch”. On March 13, 1920 Berlin was seized by counter– revolutionary officers of the Reichswehr, who aimed at restoring the monarchy and establishing a terroristic military dictatorship. The German working class replied to this attempted counter– revolutionary coup with a general strike, which spread all over the country. The putsch was defeated.
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