Written: Written on April 18, 1919
Published:
First published in 1959 in Lenin Miscellany XXXVI.
Printed from the original.
Source:
Lenin
Collected Works,
Progress Publishers,
1975,
Moscow,
Volume 44,
page 213a.
Translated: Clemens Dutt
Transcription\Markup:
R. Cymbala
Public Domain:
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Rakovsky
Kiev
In regard to the S.R.s, I advise giving no more than three and keeping these three pretty thoroughly under surveillance of the Bolsheviks, and if they do not agree— so much the worse for them, we only stand to gain.[1] Regarding military tasks, I remind you again of two of the most important: a break-through at Bukovina and the capture of Rostov. All efforts must be devoted to these two tasks—confirm this to Podvoisky and Antonov. As to Dybenko’s plans, I warn you against any adventure—I fear it will end in failure and he will be cut off.[2] Would it not be wiser to have his forces replace Makhno and strike at Taganrog and Rostov? I advise thinking it over thrice; decide yourself, of course.
[1] This refers to the inclusion of Socialist-Revolutionaries in the Ukrainian Government.
[2] This refers to an offensive by the troops of the Crimean Front, under the command of P. Y. Dybenko, into the interior of the Crimean Peninsula. The offensive was a mistake, since the attacking units could have been cut off in the Perekop Isthmus from the main forces and, moreover, at that time it was essential to concentrate maximum forces for an attack in the chief strategic direction— that of the Donets Basin and Rostov.
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