Prefaces and Introduction to the
Conspectus of Hegel’s book
The Science of Logic

Bern: Log. I. 175

Hegel’s Werke
Bd. I. Philosophische Abhandlungen
"     II. The Phenomenology of Mind
"     III-V. The Science of Logic
"     VI-VII. (1 and 2) The Encyclopaedia
"     VIII. The Philosophy of Law
"     IX. The Philosophy of History
"     X. (3 parts) Aesthetics
"     XI-XII. The History of Religion
"     XIII-XV. The History of Philosophy
"     XVI-XVII. Miscellaneous Writings
"     XVIII. Philosophical Propaedeutic
"     XIX. (1 and 2) Hegel’s Correspondence

Vol. III,^[3] p. 5 — a shrewd statement
about logic: it is a “prejudice” that it ”teach-
es how to think” (just as physiology ”teaches
... to digest”??)

... “logical science, which is the true con-
tent of genuine metaphysics or pure spec-
ulative philosophy.... ” (6)

...“Philosophy cannot borrow its method
froma subordinate science, such as mathe-
matics....” (6-7)

...“But it can be only the nature of the
content which stirs in scientific cognition,
while at the same time it is this very
reflection of the content which itself ini-
tially posits and produces its determina-
tion.” (7)

(The movement of scientific
cognition — that is the essential thing.)
“Understanding (Verstand) makes deter-
minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver-
nunft) is negative and dialectical because
it dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”)
the determinations of Understanding. (7)
The combination of these two—“Reason
which understands or Understanding which
reasons” (7) = the positive.

Negation of “the simple” ... “movement
of Mind ...” (7)

(The “path of self-construction” = the
path (this is the crux, in my opinion) of
real cognition, of the process of cognising,
of movement from ignorance to knowledge.^[4]

The movement of consciousness, “like
the development of all natural and spiri-
tual life,” rests on “the nature of the pure

essentialities which make up the content
of Logic” (Natur der reinen Wessenheiten^[5]).

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

“To present the realm of thought in its
philosophical aspect—that is, in its own

(NB) immanent activity, or (which comes

to the same thing) in its necessary (NB)
development....” (10)

“The familiar forms of thought”—an im-
portant beginning, “die leblosen Knochen
eines Skeletts.”^[6] (11)

The connection between thought
and language (the Chinese language, inciden-
tally, and its lack of development: (11),

the formation of nouns and verbs. (11)
In the German language words sometimes
have “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”^[7] (12)
(not simply “different” but opposed mean-
ings)—“a joy to thought....”

The concept of force in Physics—and
of polarity (“the things distinguished insep-
arably (Hegel’s italics) bound up to-
gether”). (12) The transition from force
to polarity—a transition to “higher Denk-
verhältnisse.”^[8] (12)

[NB also p. 11.... “But if Nature in
general is opposed, as physical, to what is
mental, then it must be said that Logic
is rather something supernatural....”]

Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,^[10] but
... “was bekannt ist, darum noch nicht
erkannt.^[11] (13)

“Infinite progress”—“liberation” of “forms
of thought” from the matter (von dem
Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of
the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning
of Knowledge....

“It was only after nearly everything that
was necessary ... was available, that people
began to trouble themselves about philo-
sophic knowledge,” says Aristotle (13-14);
and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp-
tian priests, the beginning of the mathe-
matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with
“pure thought” presupposes “a long stretch
of road already traversed by the mind

of man.” In this kind of thought

  “those interests are hushed which move
the lives of peoples and individuals.” (14)

The categories of Logic are Abbrevi-
aturen^[12] (“epitomiert”^[13] in another pas-
age) for the “endless multitude” of “par-
ticulars of external existence and of ac-
tion....” (15) In turn, these categories die-
nen^[14] people in practice (“in the
intellectual exercise of living content, in
production and interchange”). (15)

“We do not say of our feelings, impulses
and interests that they serve us—rather,
they are regarded as independent faculties
and powers...all this is just what we are.”
(15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denk-
formen) it cannot be said that they serve
us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16),
they are “the Universal as such.”

of “subjective thinking” and “the objec-
tive concept of the very essence of things”.
We cannot “get beyond the nature of things”.

“Also the remark against the "Critical
Philosophy.” (17) It conceives the relation
between “three terms” (We, Thought,
Things) so that thoughts stand “in the mid-
dle” between things and us, and so that
this middle term “separates” (abschließt)
“rather than... connects” (zusammenschli-
eBen) us. This view may be met, says
Hegel, by the “simple observation” that
“these very things which are supposed
to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ...
are themselves thought entities (Gedanken-
dinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-it-
self is only ein Gedankendingder leeren
Abstraktion.^[15]”

It is incorrect to say that Denkformen
are only a “Mittel”, “zum Gebrauch.”^[20]
(17)

It is also incorrect to say that they are
“äußere Formen,”^[21] “Formen die nur

an dem Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst
seien,” (forms which are merely forms at-
tached to the content, and not the content
itself). (17)...

And Hegel draws attention to “thoughts
of all natural and spiritual things”, to the
“substantial content....” (18)

—“To bring into clear consciousness this
logical character, which gives soul to mind
and drives and operates in it, this is our
problem.” (18)

“Instinctive action” (instinktartiges
Tun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely di-
verse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligent
and conscious action” brings out “the con-
tent of that which motivates” (den Inhalt
des Treibenden) “out of its immediate unity
with the subject” and makes it “an object
for it” (for the subject).

“In this web strong knots are formed
now and then, which are foci of the arrest
and direction of its” [the spirit’s, or the
subject’s] “life and consciousness ....” (18)

“Truth is infinite” (19) —its finiteness
is its denial, “its end”. The forms (Denk-
formen^[23]), if one regards them as forms,
“distinct from the substance and merely at-
tached to it” are incapable of embrac-
ing truth. The inaneness of these forms of
[formal logic] makes them deserving of
“contempt” (19) and “derision.” (20) The
Law of identity, A = A, —vacuousness,
“unerträglich.”^[24]. (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories
“have their place and validity in cognition.”
(20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be
“instruments of error and sophistry” (20),
not of truth.

“Contemplative thought” should include
“der Inhalt”^[25] as well as the “external form.”
(20)

...”the logos, the reason of that which
is." (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning,
the subject of logic is expressed in the
words:

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner
Notwendigkeit.”

The categories have to be derived (and
not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not
by “exposition”, not by “assurances,” but
with proofs) proceeding from the
simplest, most fundamental (Being, Noth-
ing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without
taking others)—here, in them, “in this
germ, the whole development.” (23)

Logic is usually understood as being the
“science of thinking,” the “bare form of
cognition.” (27) Hegel refutes this view.
He is against Ding an sich^[28] as “something
beyond thought.” (29)

Forms of thinking apparently “have no
applicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31)
Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,^[29] which does
not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not
Verstand^[30] also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

“Transcendental idealism, carried
more consistently to its logical conclusion, has
perceived the nullity of the spectre of the
Thing-in-itself left over from the critical
philosophy—that abstract shadow detached
from all content—and has had the aim
of demolishing it altogether. Also, this phi-
losophy (Ficthe?) made a beginning of mak-
inf reason develop its own determinations
out of itself. But the subjective attitude
of this attempt did not admit of its being
carried to completion.” (32)

Logical forms are tote Formen^[31]—
for they are not regarded as an “organic
unity,” (33) as “their living concrete unity”
(ibidem).

In the Phenomenology of Mind
I have examined “the movement of con-
sciousness, from the first direct contradiction
(Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up
to absolute knowledge. (34) This path goes
through all the forms of the relation of con-
sciousness to the object....”

“The negative is to an equal extent pos-
itive” (41)—negation is something defi-
nite, has a definite content, the inner con-
tradictions lead to the replacement of the
old content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, de-
velopment (of concept and thought), there

is not “eines inneren, notwen-
digen Zusammenhangs”^[35] (43)
of all the parts and “Übergang”^[36] of some
parts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic require-
ments:
1)  “The necessity of connection”
     and
2)  “the immanent emergence of distinctions”.

Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics
in Parmenides. ^[37]

“Dialectic is generally regarded as an
external and negative procedure, that does
not belong to the subject-matter itself,
that is based on pure vanity, as a subjec-
tive craving to shake and break down what
is fixed and true,—or that at best leads
to nothing but the inaneness of the dialec-
tically treated matter.” (43)

selbstbewegende Seele^[41]  ... (“inher-
ent negativity”) ... “the principle of all phys-
ical and spiritual life” (44)

45 Logic resembles grammar, being one
thing for the beginner and another thing
for one who knows the language (and lan-
guages) and the spirit of language. “It is
one thing for him who approaches Logic
and the Sciences in general for the first
time and another thing for him who comes
back from the sciences to Logic.”

Then logic gives “the essential character
of this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt-
vorstellung^[43]), “the inner nature of spir-
it and of the world....” (46)

“Not merely an abstract universal, but
a universal which comprises in itself the
wealth of the particular” (47)

“—Just as one and the same moral
maxim in the mouth of a youth who
understands it quite accurately does
not have the significance and scope
which it has in the mind of a man
of years and experience, for whom it
expresses the full force of its con-
tent.

Thus, the value of logic only receives due
appreciation when it is the result of ex-
perience of the sciences; then it presents
itself to the mind as universal truth, not
as a particular department of knowledge
alongside other departments and realities,
but as the essence of all this other con-
tent....” (47)

“The system of logic is the realm of
shades" (47), free from "all sensuous con-
creteness....”