Conspectus of Hegel’s
Science of Logic —
Book III (Subjective Logic or
the Doctrine of the Notion)

In the first two parts, says Hegel, I had
no Vorarbeiten,^[1] but here, on the other
hand, there is “verknöchertes Material”^[2]
(which it is necessary to “in Flüssigkeit brin-
gen”^[3]...) (3) ^[4]

“Being and Essence are the moments of
its becoming” (=des Begriffs).^[5] (5)

“Accordingly Objective Logic, which con-
siders Being and Essence, really constitutes
the genetic exposition of the Notion.” (6)

Passing to criticism of Kantian-
ism, Hegel regards as Kant’s great
merit (15) the advancement of the
idea of the “transcendental unity of
apperception” (the unity of the con-
sciousness in which the Begriff is cre-
ated), but he reproaches Kant for his
one-sidedness and subjec-
tivism:

“The object is truly in and for it-
self only as it is in thought; as it is in
intuition or ideation, it is appear-
ance....” (16) (Hegel raises Kant’s
idealism from being subjective to be-
ing objective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of con-
cepts (Wahrheit^[10] is their object),
but all the same leaves them subjective.

He makes Gefühl und Anschau-
ung^[11] precede Understanding. (Ver-
stand). Hegel speaks of this as
follows:

“Now, first, with regard to this relation
of the understanding or the Notion to the
stages which are supposed to precede it,
it is of importance what science it is that
is being treated, in order to determine the
form of these stages. In our science, since
it is pure logic, these stages are Being and
Essence. In psychology, sensation and in-
tuition and also ideation in general pre-
cede understanding. In the Phenomenology
of Mind, since it is the doctrine of con-
sciousness, the acsent was made through
the stages of sensuous consciousness and,
next, perception, to understanding.” (17)
In Kant the exposition is very “incom-
plete” here.

After that—the CHIEF THING—

...“The Notion must not here be
considered as an act of self-conscious
understanding, or as subjective under-
standing: what we have to do with

is the Notion in and for itself, which
constitutes a STAGE AS WELL OF

NATURE AS OF SPIRIT.  LIFE,
OR ORGANIC NATURE, IS
THAT STAGE OF NATURE AT
WHICH THE NOTION EMER-
GES.” (18)

There follows a very interesting passage
(pp. 19-27) where Hegel refutes Kant,
precisely epistemologically (Engels
probably had this passage in mind when he
wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach^[12] that the main
point against Kant had already been made
by Hegel, insofar as this was possible
from an idealistic standpoint),—exposing
Kant’s duality and inconsistency, his, so
to speak, vacillation between empiricism
(= materialism) and idealism, Hegel him-
self arguing wholly and exclu-
sively from the standpoint of a more
consistent idealism.

“‘It is only a notion’ is a thing com-
monly said; and not only the Idea, but sen-
suous, spatial, and temporally palpable
existence is opposed to the Notion, as
something which is more excellent than
it. And the abstract is counted of less
worth than the concrete, because from the
former so much, of that kind, of material
has been omitted. To those who hold this
view, the process of abstraction means that
for our subjective needs one or another
characteristic is taken out of the concrete in
such a manner that, while so many other
properties and modifications of the ob-
ject are omitted, it loses nothing in value

or dignity. They are the real and are reck-
oned as counting in full, only they are
left on the other side; and it is only the
incapacity of understanding to absorb such
riches that forces it to rest content with

meagre abstraction. But if the given ma-
terial of intuition and the manifold of
ideation are taken as the real in opposi-
tioh to that which is thought and to the

Notion, then this is a view the renuncia-
tion of which is not only a condition of
philosophy, but is assumed even by reli-
gion; for how can these be needed and
have significance if the fugitive and super-
ficial appearance of the sensuous and the in-
dividual are taken for the truth?.. Con-

sequently, abstracting thought must not
be considered as a mere setting-aside of
the sensuous material, whose reality is
said not to be lowered thereby; but it is
its transcendence, and the reduction of it
(as mere appearance) to the essential, which
manifests itself in the Notion only.” (19-21)

“A principal misapprehension here is
that the natural principle or the beginning,
which is the starting-point in natural de-
velopment or in the history of the individ-
ual in its formation, is taken as the true
and as that which is first also in the No-
tion.” (21) (—It is correct that people
begin with that, but truth lies not in
the beginning but in the end, or rather,
in the continuation. Truth is not the ini-
tial impression).... “But philosophy is not
meant to be a narrative of what happens,
but the cognition of what is true in happen-
ings.” (21)

In Kant there is “psychological ideal-
ism” (22): Kant's categories “are only
determinations which are derived from self-
consciousness.” (22) Rising from under-
standing (Verstand) to Reason (Vernunft),
Kant belittles the significance of thought,
denying is the capacity to “reach perfected
truth.” (23)

“It is declared” (Kant) “to be an abuse if
logic, which ought to be merely a canon
of judgment, is regarded as an organ for
the production of objective discoveries. The
notions of Reason, in which a higher

force (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper
(correct!!) content were of necessity
divined, are less Konstitutives^[13] |it should
be: Objektives^[14]| than even the categories;
they are mere ideas. Their use may cer-
tainly be permissible, but these intelligible

essences, which should wholly unlock the
truth, are to signify no more than hypothe-
ses; and it would be completely arbitrary
and reckless to ascribe any truth to them
in and for themselves, since they can occur
in no kind of experience. Could it ever
have been thought that philosophy would
gainsay the validity of the intelligible essences
because they are without the spatial and
temporal material of sensuousness?” (23)

Kant, on the other hand, quite clearly recog-
nises the “objectivity” (24) of thought
(“des Denkens”) (“an identity of the Notion
and the thing” (24))—but, on the other hand,

“the assertion is made again that we sure-
ly cannot know things as they are in and
for themselves, and that truth does not
allow cognising reason to approach it; that
truth which consists in the unity of object
and Nation is after all only appearance, and

the reason now is that content is only the
manifold of intuition. Of this argument it
has been remarked that this manifoldness,
insofar as it belongs to intuition as op-
posed to the Notion, is transcended precisely
in the Notion, and that the object is led back

by the Notion into its non-contingent essen-
tiality; the latter enters into appearance,
and for this very reason the appearance is
mamfestatlon not merely non-essential, but
manifestation of Essence.” (24, 25)

“It will always remain a matter for aston-
ishment how the Kantian philosophy knew
that relation of thought to sensuous exist-
ence, where it halted, for a merely rela-
tive relation of bare appearance, and fully
acknowledged and asserted a higher unity
of the two in the Idea in general, and, for
example, in the idea of an intuitive under-
standing; but yet stopped dead at this rel-

ative relation and at the assertion that the
Notion is and remains utterly separated

from reality;—so that it affirmed as truth
what it pronounced to be finite knowledge,
and declared to be superfluous, improper,
and figments of thought that which it
recognised as truth, and of which it estab-
lished the definite notion” (26)

In logic, the Idea “becomes the creator
of Nature.” (26)

Logic is “formelle Wissenschaft”^[17] (27)
as against the concrete sciences (of nature
and mind), but its object matter is “die
reine Warheit”^[18]....(27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is (27)
(the Critique of Pure Reason p. 83) and
giving a trivial answer (“correspondence
of knowledge with its object”), strikes at
himself, for “the fundamental assertion
of transcendental idealism” is
     —that “cognition is not capable of appre-
hending Things-in-themselves”(27)—
     —and it is clear that all this is “an
untrue idea.” (28)

In arguing against the purely formal con-
ception of logic (which Kant, too, is said
to have)—saying that from the ordinary
standpoint (truth is the correspondence
|“Übereinstimmung”| of knowledge with
the object) correspondence “essentially de-
mands two sides” (29), Hegel says that the
formal element in logic is “pure truth” (29)
and that

...“this formal element must therefore
be thought of as being in itself much richer
in determinations and content, and as hav-
ing infinitely more influence upon the
concrete, than it is generally held to have....
(29)

...“But, even if the logical forms are to
be regarded as nothing more than formal
functions of thought, yet this character
would make them worthy of an investi-
gation as to how far they correspond to
the truth in themselves. A system of logic
which neglects this can claim at most
to have the value of a natural-historical
description of the empirical phenomena of
thought.” (30-31) (Herein is said to lie

the immortal merit of Aristotle), but “it
is necessary to go further....” (31)

Cf. Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 319 ^[19]:
“But in point of fact they” (die logischen
Formen^[20]), “turned round as forms of the
notion, constitute the living spirit of the
actual....”

Begriff in its development into “adäquaten

Begriff,”^[21] becomes the Idea. (33)^[22]
“Notion in its objectivity is the object
which is in and for itself.” (33)

The dialectical movement of the “No-
tion”—from the purely “formal” notion
at the beginning—to the Judgement (Urteil),
then—to the Syllogism (Schluß) and—fi-
nally to the transformation of the subjectiv-
ity of the Notion into its objectivity.
(34-35)^[23]

The first distinguishing feature of the
Notion is Universaltity (Allegemeinheit). NB:
The Notion grew out of Essence, and the
latter out of Being.

The further development of the Uni-
versal, the Particular (Besonderes) and the
Individual (Einzelnes) is in the highest
degree abstract and “abstruse.”

The further development of the Uni-
versal, the Particular (Besonderes) and the
Individual (Einzelnes) is in the highest
degree abstract and “abstruse.”

Voilà an
abundance of
“determina-
tions” and of
Begriffsbe-
stimmungen^[26]
in this part
of the Logic!

Quoting, on p. 125, the “famous” syllo-
gism—“all men are mortal, Gaius is a man,
therefore he is mortal”—Hegel shrewdly

adds: “Boredom immediately descends when
such a syllogism is heard approaching”—
this is declared to be due to the “unnützen

Form,”^[27] and Hegel makes the profound
remark:

“All things are a Syllogism, a universal
which is bound together with individuality
through particularity; but of course they
are not wholes consisting of three propo-
sitions.” (126)

Inter alia:
     “Kant’s Antinomies of Reason are just
this, that first one determination of a No-
tion is made the foundation of the Notion,
and next, and with equal necessity,
the other....” (128-129)

Two aphorisms:

1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and
agnosticism in general) more from a vul-
gar-materialistic standpoint than from a
dialectical-materialistic standpoint, inso-
far as he merely rejects their views a li-
mine,^[34] but does not correct them (as He-
gel corrected Kant), deepening, generalis-
ing and extending them, showing the
connection and transitions of
each and every concept.

2. Marxists criticised (at the beginning
of the twentieth century) the Kantians
and Humists more in the manner of Feuer-
bach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

...“An experience which rests upon in-
duction is taken as valid although admitted-
ly the perception is not completed; but no
more can be assumed than that no example
can be produced contrary to this experience,
insofar as the latter is true in and for
itself.” (154)

The transition from the syllogism
of analogy (about analogy) to the syllogism
of necessity,—from the syllogism of induc-
tion to the syllogism of analogy,—the
syllogism of the universal to the individ-
ual—the syllogism^[35] from the individual
to the universal,—the exposition of con-
nection and transitions |con-
nection is transition|, that is Hegel’s

task. Hegel actually proved that
logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objec-

tive world. More correctly, he did not
prove, but made a brilliant guess.

In the Encyclopaedia Hegel re-
marks that the division of Understanding
and Reason, of Notions of one kind or
the other must be understood in such a way
     “that our mode of behaviour is either

to stop short at the merely negative and
abstract form of the Notion, or to conceive
the latter, in accordance with its true

nature, as that which is at once positive

and concrete. Thus, for example, if freedom
is regarded as the abstract opposite of ne-
cessity, this is merely the Notion of under-
standing of freedom, whereas the true and
rational Notion of freedom contains ne-
cessity as transcended within it.” (Pp. 347-
348), Vol. VI^[36])

Ibidem p. 349: Aristotle described the
logical forms so completely that “essen-
tially” there has been nothing to add.

Usually the “figures of the syllogism”
are regarded as empty formalism. “They”
(these figures) “have, however, a very fun-
damental meaning, based on the necessity
that every moment, as determination of
the Notion, itself becomes the whole and
mediating Ground.” (352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia (Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)

“The objective meaning of the figures
of the syllogism is in general that every-
thing rational is manifested as a threefold
syllogism, such that each of its members
assumes the position of one of the extremes

as well as that of the mediating middle.
Such, for example, is the case with the three
branches of philosophy, i. e., the Logical

Idea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Nature
that is first of all the middle, connecting
member. Nature, this immediate totality,
unfolds itself in the two extremes of the

Logical Idea and Mind.”^[37]

+ “Spirit, however, is only spirit through
being mediated by Nature.... ”It is Spirit
that recognises the logical Idea in Nature

and so raises it to its essence....” “The
logical Idea is ‘the absolute Substance
both of Spirit and of Nature, the universal,
the all-pervading.’” (353-354)

In regard to analogy an acute observation:

“It is the instinct of reason which allows
one to divine that one or another empiri-
cally found determination has its roots in
the inner nature or genus, of an object,
and which bases itself further on this de-
termination.” (357) (VoL VI, p. 359)

In ordinary logic^[38] thought is formal-
istically divorced from objectivity.

“Thought is held here to be a mere sub-
jective and formal activity, and what is
objective is held to be, in contrast to
thought, something firm and present for
itself. This dualism, however, is not the
truth, and it is thoughtless procedure to
accept the determinations of subjectivity
and objectivity in this way without fur-
ther question, and without inquiring into
their origin....” (359-360) In reality, sub-
jectivity is only a stage of development
from Being and Essence—whereupon this
subjectivity “dialectically ‘breaks through
its barrier’” and “opens out into objectiv-
ity by means of the syllogism.” (360)

Vol. VI, p. 360
     “The realised Notion” is the object.

This transition from the subject, from
the notion, to the object is said to seem
“strange,” but by the object one should
understand not simply Being, but some-
thing definitive, “something independent,
concrete and complete in itself....” (361)
“The world is the other being of the Idea.”

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and the
object—are the same and not the same....
(362).

...“It is wrong to regard subjectivity and
objectivity as a fixed and abstract antithe-
sis. Both are wholly dialectical....” (367)

(Logic) V, 178:^[39]
     The twofold significance of objectivity:
...“similarly a twofold significance appears
for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the in-
dependent Notion, but also is that which

is in and for itself....” (178)

...“The knowledge of truth is placed in
the cognition of the object as object without
the addition of any subjective reflection...”
(178)

The paragraph entitled “Law” (198-199)
does not give what could be expected
from Hegel on such an interesting question.
It is strange why “law” is referred to “mech-
anism”?

The concept of law approximates
here the concepts “order” (Ordnung);
uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessi-

ty; the “soul” der objektiven Totalität;^[40]
the “principle of self-movement.”

To be noted: on p. 210 the concept of

“Naturnotwendigkeit”^[41] is encountered—
“both mechanism and Chemism are, then,
comprehended under natural necessity”...
for we see here “its” (des Begriffs) “submer-

((( sion into externality” (ibidem).     ))

“It was mentioned that the opposition be-
tween Teleology and Mechanism is, in the
first instance, the more general opposition
between freedom and necessity. Kant sets

out the opposition in this form under the
Antinomies of Reason, as the ‘Third Con-
flict of Transcendental Ideas.’” (213) Briefly
repeating Kant’s proofs, thesis and antith-
esis, Hegel notes the hollowness of these
proofs and directs attention to the result
of Kant’s considerations:

Kant’s solution of this Antinomy is
the same as the general solution of the
others: that reason can prove neither of
these propositions, since we can have no
determinant principle a priori about the pos-
sibility of things according to mere empirical

laws of nature; consequently the two must

not be regarded as objective prop-
ositions but as subjective maxims;

on the one hand I ought always to reflect
upon all natural events according to the
principle of pure natural mechanism; but

this does" not prevent me from investigat-
ing certain forms of nature, should the
occasion be given, according to another

maxim, namely, that of final causes;—as
though these two maxims (which further
are supposed to be required only by human
reason) were not in the same opposition
in which the propositions stand.—As was

observed above, from this whole standpoint
the only question which is demanded by
philosophic interest is not looked into,
namely, which of these two principles is
true in and for itself; but, for this point

of view, it is irrelevant whether the prin-
ciples are to be considered as objective de-
terminations of nature (that is here, as de-
terminations existing externally) or as mere
maxims of a subjective cognition.—But
in fact this is a subjective, that is, a
contingent, cognition, which applies
one or the other maxim as the occasion
may suggest according to whether it thinks
it appropriate to the given objects, but
otherwise does not ask about the truth
of these determinations themselves, wheth-
er both are determinations of the objects
or of cognition.” (215-216)

“The End has turned out
to be the third term with
respect to Mechanism and
Chemism; it is their truth.
Since it still stands within
the sphere of Objectivity or
of the immediacy of the to-
tal Notion, it is still affec-
ted by externality as such;
an objective world to which
it relates itself still stands
opposed to it. From this
side mechanical causality
(in which generally Chem-
ism must be included)
still appears in this End-
relation (which is external),
but as subordinated to it
and as transcended in and
for itself.” (216-217)

...“From this results the
nature of the subordination
of the two previous forms
of the objective process: the
Other, which in them lies
in the infinite progress, is
the Notion which at first
is posited as external to
them, which is End; not
only is the Notion their
substance, but also exter-
nality is the moment which
is essential to them and con-
stitutes their determinate-

”The laws of the external
world, of nature, which are
divided into mechanical
and chemical (this is very
important) are the bases of
man’s purposive activity.

In his practical activity,
man is confronted with the
objective world, is depend-
ent on it, and determines
his activity by it.

From this aspect, from
the aspect of the practical
(purposive) activity of man,
the mechanical (and chemi-
cal) causality of the world
(of nature) appears as though
something external, as
though something secon-
dary, as though something
hidden.

Two forms of the ob-
jective process: nature
(mechanical and chemical)
and the purposive ac-
tivity of man. The mutual
relation of these forms. At
the beginning, man’s ends
appear foreign (“other”) in
relation to nature. Human
consciousness, science (“der

ness. Thus mechanical or
chemical technique sponta-
neously offers itself to the
End-relation by reason of
its character of being deter-
mined externally; and this
relation must now be
further considered.” (217)

Begriff”), reflects the essence,
the substance of nature,
but at the same time this
consciousness is something
external in relation to na-
ture (not immediately, not
simply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL  AND
CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE
serves human ends just be-

cause its character (essence)
consists in its being deter-
mined by external condi-
tions (the laws of nature).

...“It” (der Zweck^[42]) “has before it an
objective, Mechanical and Chemical world,
to which its activity relates itself as to
something already given....” (219-220) “To
this extent it still has a truly extra-
mundane existence, namely, insofar as
this objectivity stands opposed to it....”
(220)

“The End binds itself with objectivity
through a Means, and in objectivity with
itself.” (221 §: “The Means.”)

Further, since the End is finite it has
a finite content; accordingly it is not
absolute or utterly in and for itself reason-
able. The Means however is the external
middle of the syllogism which is the realisa-
tion of the End; in it therefore reason-
ableness manifests itself as such—as pre-
serving itself in this external Other and
precisely through this externality. To that
extent the Means is higher than the finite
Ends of external usefulness: the plough
is more honourable than those immediate
enjoyments which are procured by it, and
serve as Ends. The instrument is preserved,
while the immediate enjoyments pass away

and are forgotten. IN HIS TOOLS MAN
POSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNAL
NATURE. ALTHOUGH AS REGARDS
HIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUB-
JECTED TO IT.” (226)

When Hegel endeavours—sometimes
even huffs and puffs—to bring man’s
purposive activity under the categories
of logic, saying that this activity
is the “syllogism” (Schluß), that the
subject (man) plays the role of a “mem-
ber” in the logical “figure” of the

“syllogism,” and so on—THEN THAT
IS NOT MERELY STRETCHING A
POINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HAS
A VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MA-
TERIALISTIC CONTENT. IT HAS TO
BE INVERTED: THE PRACTICAL
ACTIVITY OF MAN HAD TO LEAD
HIS CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE REPE-

TITION OF THE VARIOUS LOGICAL
FIGURES THOUSANDS OF MILLIONS
OF TIMES  IN ORDER THAT
THESE FIGURES COULD OBTAIN
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AXIOMS.
THIS NOTA BENE.

“The movement of the End has now
achieved that the moment of externality
is posited not only in the Notion, and
the Notion is not only Ought and tendency,
but, as concrete totality, is identical

with immediate Objectivity.” (235) At the
end of the § on “The Realised End,” at the
end of the section (Chapter III: “Te-
leology”)—of Section II: “Objectivi-
ty,” the transition to Section III: “The
Idea.”

The beginning of Section III: “The Idea”

“The Idea is the adequate Notion: ob-
jective truth, or the truth as
such.” (236)

In general, the introduction to Section III
(“The Idea”) of Part II to the Logic
(“Subjective Logic”) (Volume V, pp.236-
243) and the corresponding §§ of the

Encyclopaedia (§§ 213-215)—ARE PER-
HAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF
DIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence,

so to speak, of logic and epistemology is
shown in a remarkable brilliant way.

The expression “Idea” is used also in
the sense of a simple representation.
Kant.

“Kant has claimed the expression idea
again for the Notion of reason. Now accord-

ing to Kant the Notion of reason is to be

the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with
respect to phenomena, to be transcen-
dental, which means that it is impossible
to make any adequate empirical use of
it. Notions of reason (according to Kant)
are to serve for the conceptual compre-
hension, and Notions of understanding
for the bare understanding, of percep-
tions. But, in fact, if the latter really

are Notions then they are Notions,—con

ceptual comprehension takes place through
them....” (236)

It is equally incorrect to regard the Idea
as something “unreal”—as people say: “it
is merely an idea.”

If thoughts are merely subjective and
contingent they certainly have no further
value; but in this they are not inferior
to temporal and contingent actualities,
which also have no further value except that

which is proper to contingencies and phe-
nomena. And if conversely the Idea is not
to be rated as true because, with respect
to phenomena, it is transcendental, and no
object can be assigned to it, in the sen-
suous world, coinciding with it, this
is a strange lack of understanding,—for
so the Idea is denied objective validity
because it lacks that which constitutes
appearance, or the untrue being of the ob-
jective world.” (237-238)

In relation to practical ideas, Kant him-
self admits that the appeal to experience
against ideas is pöbelhaft^[43]: he holds ideas
as a Maximum to which one should endeav-
our to bring actuality closer. And Hegel
continues:
     “But, the result having been reached that
the Idea is the unity of the Notion and
Objectivity, the truth, it must not merely
be considered as a goal which must be

approached while it still remains a kind
of beyond; it must be held that whatever
is actual is only insofar as it contains
and expresses the Idea. The object, and

the objective and subjective world, not

merely ought to conform to the Idea, but
are themselves the conformity of Notion
and reality; that reality which does not
correspond to the Notion is mere appear-
ance, or that subjective, contingent, ca-
pricious entity which is not the truth.” (238)

“It” (die Idee) “is,  first,
simple truth, the identity
of the Notion and Objec-
tivity as a universal....
(242)

...“Secondly, it is the re-
lation of the Subjectivity,
which is for itself, of the
simple Notion to its Ob-
jectivity which is distinct
from it, the former is es-
sentially the impulse to tran-
scend this separation....

...“As this relation, the
Idea is the process in which
it sunders itself into in-
dividuality and its inor-
ganic nature, and again
brings the latter back un-
der the power of the sub-
ject, returning to the first
simple universality. The
self-identity of the Idea is
one with the process; and
the thought which frees ac-
tuality from the semblance
of purposeless changeabili-
ty and transfigures it into
the Idea must not imagine
this truth of actuality as
a dead repose or bare pic-
ture, matt, without im-
pulse or motion, or as a gen-
ius, number, or abstract
thought. In the Idea the
Notion reaches freedom, and
because of this the Idea
contains also the harshest

The idea (read: man’s
knowledge) is the coinci-
dence (conformity) of no-
tion and objectivity (the
“universal”). This—first.

Secondly, the idea is the
relation of the subjectiv-
ity (= man) which is for
itself (= independent, as it
were) to the objectivity
which is distinct (from
this Idea)....

Subjectivity is the im-
pulse to destroy this sepa-
ration (of the idea from
the object).
     Cognition is the process
of the submersion (of
the mind) in an inorganic
nature for the sake of
subordinating it to the
power of the subject and
for the sake of gener-
alisation (cognition of the
universal in its phenome-
na)....
     The coincidence of
thought with the object is a
process: thought (= man)
must not imagine truth in
the form of dead repose,
in the form of a bare pic-
ture (image), pale (matt),
without impulse, without
motion, like a genus, like
a number, like abstract
thought.
     The idea contains also

opposition; its repose con-
sists in the security and
certainty with which it eter-
nally creates and eternally
overcomes it, coinciding in
it with itself.”

the strongest contradiction,
repose (for man’s thought)
consists in the firmness and
certainty with which he
eternally creates (this con-
tradiction between thought

and object) and eternally
overcomes it....
 

Cognition is the eternal, endless
approximation of thought to the ob-
ject. The reflection of nature in man’s
thought must be understood not “life-
lessly,” not “abstractly,” not dev-
oid of movement, not with-
out contradictions, but in the
eternal process of movement, the aris-
ing of contradictions and their solution.

“The Idea is ... the Idea
of the True and of the
Good, as Cognition and Vo-
lition.... The process of this
finite cognition and (NB)
action (NB) makes the
universality, which at first
is abstract, into a totali-
ty, whence it becomes per-
fected objectivity.” (243)

The idea is Cognition and
aspiration (volition) [of
man]... The process of (tran-
sitory, finite, limited) cog-
nition and action converts
abstract concepts into per-
fected objectivity.

Also in the Encyclo-
paedia (Vol. VI).^[45] En-
cyclopaedia § 213
(p. 385)

...“The Idea is truth,
for truth is the correspond-
ence of objectivity with
the Notion.... But also
everything actual, insofar
as it is true, is the Idea...
The individual Being is
some one aspect of the
Idea; hence it requires also
other actualities, which
likewise appear as existing
specially for themselves; it
is only in all of them to-
gether and in their rela-
tion that) the Notion is
realised. The individual by
itself does not correspond
to its Notion; this limi-
tation of its determinate
existence constitutes its fi-
nitude and its downfall....”

Individual Being (an ob-
ject, a phenomenon, etc.)
is (only) one side of the
Idea (of truth). () Truth re-
quires still other sides of
reality, which likewise ap-
pear only as independent
and individual (besonders
für sich bestehende^[46]).
Only in their to-
tality, (zusammen), and
in their relation (Be-
ziehung) is truth realised.

(The totality of all sides of the
phenomenon, of reality and their (re-
ciprocal) relations—that is what
truth is composed of. The relations
(= transitions = contradictions) of
notions = the main content of logic,
by which these concepts (and their
relations, transitions, contradictions)
are shown as reflections of the objec-
tive world. The dialectics of things
produces the dialectics of ideas, and
not vice versa.)

# This aphorism should be expressed
more popularly, without the word dia-
lectics: approximately as follows: In
the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their
opposites, in the transitions of one no-
tion into another, in the eternal change,
movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly
divined PRECISELY THIS RELA-
TION OF THINGS, OF NATURE.

=......................
mutual dependence of notions
    ”           ”     all        ”
       without exception
transitions of notions from
                     one into another
    ”          all         ”    without
                                exception.

The relativity of opposition between notions...
the identity of opposites between notions.

“Truth is first of all taken to mean
that I know how something is. This is
truth, however, only in reference to con-
sciousness, or formal truth, bare correct-
ness. (§ 213, 386) Truth in the deeper
sense, on the contrary; consists in the
identity between objectivity and the
Notion....

“A bad man is an untrue man, i.e.,
a man who does not behave in confor-
mity with the notion of him, or his posi-
tion. Nothing, however, can exist entire-
ly devoid of identity between the no-
tion and reality. Even what is bad and
untrue has being only insofar as its real-
ity still, somehow, conforms to its no-
tion....

...“Everything deserving the name of
philosophy has always been based on
the consciousness of an absolute unity
of that which the understanding
accepts as valid only in its sep-
aration....”

“The stages of Being and Essence hith-
erto considered, as well as those of No-
tion and of Objectivity, are not, when so
distinguished, something permanent,
resting upon themselves. But they have
proved to be dialectical, and their truth con-
sists only in being moments of the
idea.” (387-388)

Vol. VI, p. 388 (§ 214):

“The Idea may be described in many
ways. It may be called reason (this is the
proper philosophical signification of rea-
son); also subject-object; the unity of the
ideal and the real, of the finite and the
infinite, of soul and body; the possibility
which has its actuality in its own self;
that whose nature can be conceived only
as existent, etc. All these descriptions

apply, because the Idea contains all the
relations of understanding; but contains
them in their infinite self-return and self-

identity.

“It is easy work for the understanding to
show that everything said of the Idea is
self-contradictory. But that can quite as well
be rendered to the understanding or rather
it is already accomplished in the idea. And
this work, which is the work of reason, is
certainly not so easy as that of the under-
standing.—The understanding may demon-
strate that the Idea is self-contradictory,
because, for instance, the subjective is
only subjective and is always confronted
by the objective; that Being is something
quite different from the notion and there-
fore cannot be extracted out of it; and that
likewise the finite is only finite and the

exact antithesis of the infinite, and there-
fore not identical with it; and so on with
all the determinations. Logic, however,
demonstrates the opposite of all this, name-

ly, that the subjective, which is to be
subjective only, the finite, which is to be
finite only, the infinite, which is to be
infinite only, and so on, have no truth,
but contradict themselves, and pass into
their opposites. Thus, this transition, and
the unity in which the extremes are in-
cluded as transcended, as appearance or
moments, is revealed as their truth. (388)

“The understanding, when it tackles the
Idea, falls into a double misunderstand-

ing. First, it takes the extremes of the
Idea (be they expressed as they will, so
long as they are in their unity) still in
that sense and determination in which

they are not in their concrete unity, but

remain abstractions outside of the Idea.
“It” (der Verstand^[47]) “no less mistakes the
relation between them, even when it has

been expressly stated; thus, for example, it over-
looks even the nature of the copula
in the judgment, which affirms that
the individual, the subject, is just as
much not individual, but uni-
versal.—In the second place, the understand-

ing believes its reflection,—that the self-indent-
ical Idea contains its own negative, the
contradiction,—to be an external reflec-
tion which does not lie within the Idea itself.
In fact, however, this is not the understand-
ing’s own wisdom. The Idea itself
is the dialectic which for ever sepa-

rates and distinguishes the self-identical
from the differentiated, the subjective from

the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul
from the body. Only insofar is it an eter-
nal creation, eternal vitality,
and eternal spirit....” (389)

VI, § 215, p. 390:

The Idea is essentially a process, be-
cause its identity is the absolute and free
identity of the notion, only insofar as
it is absolute negativity and for that
reason dialectical.”

Hence, Hegel says, the expression “uni-
ty” of thinking and being, of finite and
infinite, etc., is falsch,^[48] because it ex-
presses “quietly persisting identity.” It is
not true that the finite simply neutral-
ises (“netralisiert”) the infinite and vice
versa. Actually, we have a process.

If one calculates ... every second more
than ten persons in the world die, and
still more are born. “Movement” and “mo-
ment”: catch it. At every given moment
... catch this moment. Idem in simple
mechanical motion (contra Chernov).^[49]

“The idea as a process runs through
three stages in its development. The first
form of the idea is Life.... The second form
is ... the idea in the form of Knowledge,
which appears under the double aspect
of the theoretical and practical idea. The
process of knowledge results in the resto-
ration of unity enriched by difference,
and this gives the third form, that of
the Absolute Idea...” (391)

Logic. Volume V.

Section Three: Idea. Chapter I. Life.

The question of Life does not belong to
“logic as it is commonly imagined.” (Bd.
V. p. 244^[50]) If, however, the subject-mat-
ter of logic is truth, and “truth as
such wesentlich im Erkennen
ist,^[51]” then cognition has to be dealt
with—in connection with cognition it is
already (p. 245) necessary to speak of
life.

Sometimes so-called “pure logic” is fol-
lowed by “applied” (angewandte) logic, but
then...

...“every science must be absorbed in
logic, since each is an applied logic in-
sofar as it consists in apprehending its
object in forms of thought and of the
Notion.” (244)

Subdivisions:^[53]
1) Life, as “the living individual” (§ A)
2) “The Life-process”
3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung), re-
     production of man, and transition to
     cognition.

Or again, reproduction of
man ... “is their” (of two
individuals of different sex)
“realised identity, is the
negative unity of the kind
which intro-reflects itself
out of the division....” (261)

...“Its” (des Begriffs^[55]) “reality in gener-
al is the form of its determinate existence,
and what matters is the determination
of this form; upon this depends the
distinction of that which the Notion is in
itself or as subjective, and of what it is
as submerged into Objectivity, and next
in the Idea of Life.” (263)

...“Spirit not only is infi-
nitely richer than Nature,
but the absolute unity of
opposites in the Notion con-
stitutes its essence....” (264)

In Kant “the Ego” is as a transcenden-
tal subject of thoughts” (264); “At the
same time this Ego, according to Kant’s
own expression, is awkward in this respect,

that we must always make use of it in
order to make any judgment about it....”
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p. 265)

“In his” (= Kant’s) “criticism of these
determinations” (namely: abstrakte ein-

seitige Bestimmungen “der vormaligen—
pre-Kantian—Metaphysik”^[56] concerning the
“soul”) “he” (Kant) “simply followed Hume’s
sceptical manner: holds fast to that which
appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from

which however everything empirical must
be omitted, since the aim is to know its
essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now noth-
ing remains but the phenomenon of the
I think which accompanies every idea;
and nobody has the slightest notion of this
‘I think.’” (266) # # #

# # # ...“It must certainly be admitted
that it is impossible to have the slightest
notion of Ego or anything else (the No-
tion included), if no Notion is formed
and a halt is made at the simple, fixed,
general idea and name.” (266)

According to Hegel, the old metaphysics,
in the endeavour to cognise truth, divided
objects in accordance with the characteris-
tic of truth into substances and phenomena.
Kant’s Critique rejected the investigation
of truth.... “But to stand fast at appearance
and what proves to be mere sensuous
representation in everyday consciousness
is tantamount to a renunciation of the
Notion and of philosophy.” (269)

§ A:
“The Idea of the True. At first the sub-
jective Idea is impulse.... Consequently,
the impulse has the determinateness of
cancelling its own subjectivity, of making
concrete its reality (which was abstract
at first) I and of filling it, for content,
with the world which is presupposed by
its subjectivity.... As Cognition is the Idea
as End or as subjective idea, so the ne-
gation of the world which is presupposed
as being in itself is first negation....”
(274-275)

“Strangely enough this side
of finitude has latterly” (ob-
viously Kant) “been seized upon
and has been taken to be the
absolute relation of Cognition—

as though the finite as such was
to be the absolute! From this
point of view the Object is
assigned the unknown property
of being a Thing-in-itself beyond
cognition, which, together with
truth, is considered an absolute
Beyond for Cognition.

The determinations of thought in general,
the categories and the determinations of
reflection as well as the formal Notion

and its moments, are here given the posi-
tion not that they are finite determina-
tions in and for themselves, but that they
are so in the sense that they are subjective

as against that empty Thinghood-in-itself;
the error of taking this relation of the
untruth of Cognition as valid has become
the universal opinion of modern times.”
(276)

...“But cognition must by its own pro-
cess resolve its finitude and therefore its
contradiction.” (277)

...“It is one-sided to imagine analysis
in such a manner as though nothing were
in the object except what has been put
into it; and it is equally one-sided to
think that the determinations which re-
sult are simply taken out of it. The former
idea is, as is known, the thesis of sub-
jective idealism, which in analysis takes
the activity of Cognition only as a one-
sided positing, beyond which the Thing-
in-itself remains hidden; the latter idea
belongs to so-called realism, which takes
the subjective Notion as an empty iden-
tity that absorbs the thought-determina-
tions from without.” (280)
     ...“But the two moments cannot be sep-
arated; in its abstract form, into which

analysis elaborates it, the logical is cer-
tainly present only in Cognition; while
conversely it is not only something posited
but also something which is in itself.” (280)

And further 281-282 very important
on the transition of the categories
into one another (and against Kant, p. 282).

Logic, Vol. V, p. 282 (the end)^[60]

...“Kant ... takes up the determinate
connection (the relation-notions and the

synthetic principles themselves) from for-
mal logic as given. They ought to have
been deduced by the exposition of the
transition of this simple unity of self-con-
sciousness into these its determinations and
distinctions; but Kant spared himself the
trouble of demonstrating this veritably
synthetic progress, that of the self-
producing Notion.” (282)

286-287—Turning once more to higher
     mathematics (showing, inter alia, that
     he is familiar with Gauss’ solution of
     the equation X^m—1=0^[61], Hegel again
     touches on the differential and integral
     calculus, and says that:

“to this day mathematics by itself, that
is, in a mathematical manner, has failed
in justifying these operations, which are
based upon this transition” (from one mag-
nitude to another), “for the transition is
not of a mathematical nature.” Hegel says
that Leibnitz, to whom is ascribed the hon-
our of having discovered the differential
calculus, effected this transition “in a most
inadequate manner, a manner both thor-
oughly notionless and unmathematical....”
(287)

“Analytic cognition is the first premise
of the whole syllogism,—the immediate
relation of the Notion to the Object. Con-
sequently, identity is the determination
which it recognises as its own: it is only
the apprehension of what is. Synthetic
Cognition endeavours to form a Notion
of what is, that is, to grasp the multiplic-
ity of determinations in its unity. Hence
it is the second premise of the syllogism
in which terms various as such are related.
Its goal is therefore necessity in general.”
(288)

Regarding the practice in certain scien-
ces (e.g., physics) of taking various “for-
ces,” etc., for “explanation,” and of pulling
in (stretching), adjusting the facts, etc.,
Hegel makes the following clever remark:

“It is now seen that the so-called expla-
nation and proof of the concrete element
which is brought into Propositions is partly

a tautology and partly a confusion of the
true relationship; partly, too, it is seen that
this confusion served to disguise the trick
of Cognition, which takes up the data of
experience one-sidedly (the only manner

in which it could reach its simple defini-
tions and formulas), and does away with
refutation from experience by proposing
and taking as valid experience not in its
concrete totality but as example, and only
in that direction which is serviceable for
the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete
experience being thus subordinated to the
presupposed determinations, the foundation
of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited
only from that side which is in conformity
with the theory.” (315-316)

The old metaphysics (e.g., of Wolff
[example: ridiculous pomposity over tri-
vialities, etc.]) was overthrown by Kant
and Jacobi. Kant showed that “strict de-
monstration” led to antimonies,
     “but he” (Kant) “did not reflect upon
the nature of this demonstration, which is
bound to a finite content; yet the two stand
and fall together.” (317)

Synthetic cognition is still not complete,
for “the Notion does not become unity with

itself in its object or its reality.... Hence
in this Cognition the Idea does not yet
reach truth because of the inadequacy of
the object to the subjective Notion.—But
the sphere of Necessity is the highest

point of Being and of Reflection; in and
for itself it passes over into the freedom
of the Notion, while the inner identity
passes over into its manifestation, which
is the Notion as Notion....”

...“The Idea, insofar as the Notion is
now for itself the Notion determinate in
and for itself, is the Practical Idea, or
Action.” (319) And the following § is
headed “B: The Idea of the Good.”

 
 
 
Practice in the theory
     of knowledge:

(320) “As subjective It”
(der Begriff) “has again the
presupposition of an other-
ness which is in itself; it is
the impulse to realise itself,
or the end which tries to
give itself objectivity in the
objective world, and to car-
ry itself out, through itself.
In the Theoretical Idea the
subjective Notion stands op-
posed, as the universal
which is indeterminate in
and for itself, to the ob-
jective world, from which
it draws determinate con-
tent and fulfilment. But in
the Practical Idea it stands
opposed as actual to the
actual. But the self-certain-
ty which the subject has
in the fact of its deter-
minateness in and for itself,
is a certainty of its own
actuality and of the non-
actuality of the world;....”
......

The notion (= man), as
subjective, again presup-
posed an otherness which
is in itself (= nature inde-
pendent of man). This no-
tion (= man) is the im-
pulse to realise itself, to
give itself objectivity in
the objective world through
itself, and to realise (ful-
fil) itself.
     In the theoretical idea
(in the sphere of theory)
the subjective notion (cog-
nition?), as the universal
and in and for itself inde-
terminate, stands opposed
to the objective world, from
which it obtains determi-
nate content and fulfilment.
     In the practical idea (in
the sphere if practice) this
notion as the actual (act-
ing?) stands opposed to the
actual.
     The self-certainty which
the subject [[here sudden-

ly instead of “Notion”]] has
in its being in and for it-
self, as a determinate sub-
ject, is a certainty of its
own actuality and of the
non-actuality of the world.

...“This determinateness,
which is contained in the
Notion, and is equal to it,
and includes within itself
the demand of the individ-
ual external actuality, is
the Good. It appears with

The essence:
     The “good” is a “demand
of external actuality,” i.e.,
by the “good” is understood
man’s practice = the de-
mand (1) also of external
actuality (2).

the dignity of absoluteness,
because it is the totality of
the Notion within itself—
the objective in the form
simultaneously of free unity

and subjectivity. This Idea
is higher than the Idea
of Cognition which has
already been consid-
ered, for it has not only the
dignity of the universal but
also of the simply ac-
tual....” (320-321)

Practice is higher
than (theoretical)
knowledge, for it has not
only the dignity of univer-
sality, but also of immedi-
ate actuality.

 
     ...“Consequently, the ac-
tivity of the end is not di-
rected against itself, for the
purpose of absorbing and
assimilating a given deter-
mination; it aims rather at
positing its own determi-
nation, and, by transcend-
ing the determinations of

 
     “The activity of the end
is not directed against it-
self....
     but aims, by destroying
definite (sides, features,
phenomena) of the exter-
nal world, at giving itself
reality in the form of ex-
ternal actuality....”

the external world, at giv-
ing itself reality in the form
of external actuality....”
(321)

...“The realised Good is good by virtue of what it is
already in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realisation gives
it an external existence....” (322). “Presupposed to it (the
Good) is the objective world, in the presupposition of which
the subjectivity and finitude of the Good consists and
which, as being other, pursues its own course; and in it
even the realisation of the Good is exposed to obstacles,
and may even be made impossible....” + (322-323) ...“Pre-
supposed to it (the Good) is the objective world, in the pre-
supposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the Good
consists and which, as being other, pursues its own
course; and in it even the realisation of the Good is exposed
to obstacles, and may even be made impossible.....+
(322-323)

+ ...“Thus the Good remains an Ought; it is in and for
itself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remains
determined against it as a not-Being too....”++ (323)

++ ...“Although the Idea of the perfected

Good is an absolute postulate, it is no more
than a postulate,—that is, the absolute
infected with the determinateness of

subjectivity. There are still two worlds
in opposition: one a realm of subjec-

tivity in the pure spaces of trans-
parent thought, the other a realm
of objectivity in the element of an exter-
nally manifold actuality, which is an
unexplored realm of darkness. The com-
plete development of the unresolved con-

tradiction, of that absolute end which the
barrier of this actuality insuperably op-
poses, has been considered more closely
in Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 453
et seq....” (323)

...“In the latter” (= der theoretischen
Idee^[64] in contrast to der praktischen Idee^[65])
...“Cognition knows itself only as appre-
hension, as the self-identity of the No-
tion, which for itself is indeterminate;
fulfilment, that is, objectivity determined
in and for itself, is given to it, and that
which truly is is the actuality that is

present independently of subjective
positing. The Practical Idea on the other

hand counts this actuality (which at the
same time opposes it as an insuperable
barrier) as that which in and for itself
is null, which is to receive its true deter-
mination and sole value through the ends
of the Good. Will itself consequently bars

the way to its own goal insofar as it
separates itself from Cognition and
external actuality does not, for it,
retain the form of that which truly

is; consequently the Idea of the Good can
find its complement only in the Idea of
the True.” (323-324)

And immediately following this:
     “But it makes this transition through

itself” (the transition of the idea of truth
into the idea of the Good, of theory into
practice, and vice versa). “In the syllo-
gism of action one premise is the immediate

relation of the good end to actuality,
of which it makes itself master, directing
it (in the second premise) as external
means against external actuality.” (324)

...“The realisation of the Good in the
teeth of an opposing and other actuality
is the mediation which is essential for
the immediate relation and actualisation
of the Good....” (325)

...“If now in spite of this” (through activ-
ity) “the end of the Good should not be
realised, then this is a relapse of the Notion
to the standpoint which the Notion has
before its activity—the standpoint of that
actuality which was determined as null
and yet was presupposed as real. This
relapse becomes a progress to bad infin-
ity; it has its only ground in the fact
that in the transcendence of this abstract

reality the transcendence is equally imme-
diately forgotten, or that it is forgotten
that this reality has already been presup-
posed as non-objective actuality which is
null in and for itself.” (325)

+ ...Presupposition in general is here
transcended,—that is, the determination

of the Good as an end which is merely
subjective and restricted in its content,

the necessity of realising it by subjective
activity, and this activity itself. In the
result mediation transcends itself; the
result is an immediacy which is not the
reconstitution of the presupposition but
rather the fact of its transcendedness. The
Idea of the Notion which is determined
in and for itself is thus posited no longer
merely in the active subject, but equally

as an immediate actuality; and the latter
conversely is posited as it is in Cogni-
tion, as objectivity which truly is."
(326)

...“In this result then Cognition is re-

constructed and united with the
Practical Idea; the actuality which is
found as given is at the same time determined

as the realised absolute end,—not however
(as in inquiring Cognition) merely as ob-
jective world without the subjectivity of
the Notion, but as objective world whose
inner ground and actual persistence is the
Notion. This is the Absolute Idea.” (327)
((End of Chapter II. Transition to Chap-
ter III: “The Absolute Idea.”))

Chapter III: “The Absolute Idea.” (327)

...“The Absolute Idea has turned out
to be the identity of the Theoretical and the
Practical Idea; .each of these by itself
is one-sided....” (327)

What remains to be considered is no lon-
ger Inhalt,^[68] but ...“the universal element
of its form—that is, the method.” (329)

“In inquiring cognition the method is
likewise in the position, of a tool, of a
means which stands on the subjective side,
whereby the subjective side relates itself to
the object.... But in true cognition the meth-
od is not merely a quantity of certain
determinations; it is the fact that the No-
tion is determined in and for itself, and
is the middle member” (in the logical figure
of the syllogism) “only because it equally
has the significance of objective....” (331)

...“The absolute method” (i.e., the meth-
od of cognition of objective truth) “on
the other hand does not behave as exter-
nal reflection; it draws the determinate
element directly from its object itself,
since it is the object’s immanent principle
and soul.—It was this that Plato demanded

of cognition, that it should consider things
in and for themselves, and that while part-
ly considering them in their universality
it should also hold fast to them, not catch-
ing at externals, examples and compari-
sons, but contemplating the things alone
and bringing before consciousness what
is immanent in them....” (335-336)

This method of “absolute cognition” is ana-
lytic... “but equally it is synthetic” (336)

“Dieses so sehr synthetische als analy-
tische Moment des Urteils, wodurch das
anfängliche Allgemeine aus ihm selbst als
das Andere Seiner sich bestimmt, ist das
dialektische zu nennen” ... (336) (+ see
the next page).^[69]   →

[Back to top]
    A determination which is not a clear
one!!^[70]

1) The determination of the concept out
of itself [the thing itself must be consid-
ered in its relations and in its develop-
ment];

2) the contradictory nature of the thing
itself (das Andere seiner^[71]), the contra-
dictory forces and tendencies in each phe-
nomenon;

3) the union of analysis and synthesis.

Such apparently are the elements of
dialectics.

One could perhaps present these ele-
ments in greater detail as follows:

1. the objectivity of consideration
   (not examples, not divergencies, but
   the Thing-in-itself).
                          X
2. the entire totality of the manifold
   relations of this thing to others.
3. the development of this thing,
   (phenomenon, respectively), its own
   movement, its own life.
4. the internally contradictory tenden-
   cies (and sides) in this thing.
5. the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the
   sum  and
         #
   unity of opposites.
6. the struggle, respectively unfold-
   ing, of these opposites, contradictory
   strivings, etc.
7. the union of analysis and synthesis—
   the break-down of the separate parts
   and the totality, the summation of
   these parts.
8. the relations of each thing (phenome-
   non, etc.) are not only manifold, but
   general, universal. Each thing (phe-
   nomenon, process, etc.) is connected
   with  every other.    X
9. not only the unity of opposites, but
   the transitions of every de-
   termination, quality, feature, side,
   property into every other [into its
   opposite?].
10. the endless process of the discovery
    of new sides, relations, etc.
11. the endless process of the deepening
    of man’s knowledge of the thing, of
    phenomena, processes, etc., from ap-
    pearance to essence and from less pro-
    found to more profound essence.
12. from co-existence to causality and from
    one form of connection and reciprocal
    dependence to another, deeper, more
    general form.
13. the repetition at a higher stage of
    certain features, properties, etc., of
    the lower and
14. the apparent return to the old (nega-
    tion of the negation).
15. the struggle of content with form and
    conversely. The throwing off of the
    form, the transformation of the con-
    tent.
16. the transition of quantity into quality
    and vice versa ((15 and 16 are examples of 9))

+ (continuation. See the previous
page.^[72])

←...“Dialectics is one of those ancient
sciences which has been most misjudged in
modern metaphysics [here obviously = the-
ory of knowledge and logic] and in the
popular philosophy of ancients and mod-

erns alike....” (336) Diogenes Laertius
said of Plato that he was the father of
dialectics, the third philosophical science
(as Thales was the father of natural phi-
losophy and Socrates of moral philoso-

phy), but that those who are particularly
loud in talking about this merit of Plato’s
give little thought to it....

...“Dialectics has often been considered
an art, as though it rested upon a sub-
jective talent and did not belong to the
objectivity of the Notion....” (336-337)

It is an important merit of Kant’s to have
re-introduced dialectics, to have recognised
it as “necessary” (a property) “;of reason”
(337) but the result (of the application
of dialectics) must be “opposite” (to Kant-
ianism). See below.

There follows a very interesting, clear
and important outline of dialectics.

...“Besides generally appearing as con-
tingent, dialectics usually has this more
detailed form, that when in respect of any
particular object, e.g., the world, mo-
tion, point, etc., it is shown that it has
any particular determination—e.g. (in
the order of the above-mentioned objects)
finitude in space or time, presence at
this place, absolute negation of space—
it is, however, shown further that it has
with equal necessity the opposite deter-
mination, e.g., infinity in space and time,
non-presence at this place, and a rela-
tion to space, consequently spatiality. The

older Eleatic school applied its dialec-
tics chiefly against motion; Plato frequent-
ly against contemporary ideas and con-
cepts (especially those of the Sophists),

but also against pure categories and re-

flection-determinations; the developed lat-
er scepticism extended it not only to
the immediate so-called data of conscious-
ness and maxims of ordinary life, but

also to all the concepts of science. The
conclusion which is drawn from such dia-
lectics is contradiction and the nullity of
the assertions made. But it may occur in
a double sense,—in the objective sense,
the object which thus contradicts itself
being held to cancel itself and to be null
(—this was, for instance, the Eleatic con-
clusion, by which, for example, the world,
motion, and the point were deprived of
truth), or in the subjective sense, cogni-

tion being held to be defective. The latter
conclusion is sometimes understood to mean
that it is only this dialectics that effects
the trick of an illusive show. This is the

ordinary view of so called sound common
sense, which holds fast to the evidence
of the senses and to customary ideas and
expressions....” (337-338)

Diogenes the Dog,^[73] for example,
proved movement by walking up and
down, “a vulgar refutation” (338), says
Hegel.

...“Or again the result reached—that of
subjective nullity—relates, not to the dia-
lectic itself, but rather to the cognition
against which it is directed, and in the
sense of scepticism and likewise of the
Kantian philosophy, to cognition in gener-

al....” (338)

“The fundamental prejudice here is
that the dialectic has only a negative re-
sult,” (338)

Among other things, it is said that
it is a merit of Kant’s to have drawn
attention to dialectics and to the con-
sideration “of the determinations of thought
in and for themselves” (339)

“The object in its existence without
thought and Notion is an image or a name:
it is what it is in the determinations of
thought and Notion....”

...“It must not therefore be considered the
fault of an object, or of cognition, that they
manifest themselves as dialectical by their
nature and by an external connection....”

...“Thus all opposites which are taken
as fixed, such as, for example, finite and
infinite, or individual and universal, are
contradictory not by virtue of some exter-
nal connection, but rather are transitions
in and for themselves, as the considera-
tion of their nature showed....” (339)

“Now this is the standpoint which was
referred to above, in which a universal
   #
first term considered in and for itself
shows itself to be its own Other....” (340)

...“But the Other is essentially not the

empty negative or Nothing which is com-
monly taken as the result of dialec-
tics, it is the Other of the first, the negative

of the immediate; it is thus determined

as mediated,—and altogether contains the
determination of the first. The first is thus
essentially contained and preserved in the
Other.—To hold fast the positive in its neg-

ative, and the content of the presupposition

in the result, is the most important part
of rational cognition; also only the simplest
reflection is needed to furnish conviction
of the absolute truth and necessity of this
requirement, while with regard to the
examples of proofs, the whole of Logic
consists of these.” (340)

Dialectics consists in general in the ne-
gation of the first proposition, in its re-
placement by a second (in the transition
of the first into the second, in the demon-
stration of the connection of the first
with the second, etc.). The second can be
made the predicate of the first—

— “for example, the finite is infinite,
one is many, the individual is the
universal....” (341)

...“The first or immediate term is the No-

tion in itself, and therefore is the nega-
tive only in itself; the dialectical moment
with it therefore consists in this, that
the distinction which it implicitly contains
is posited in it. The second term on the
other hand is itself the determinate en-

tity, the distinction or relation; hence with
it the dialectical moment consists in the
positing of the unity which is contained
in it....”— (341-342)

(In relation to the simple and origi-
nal, “first,” positive assertions, proposi-
tions, etc., the “dialectical moment”, i.e.,
scientific consideration, demands the dem-
onstration of difference, connection, tran-
sition. Without that the simple positive
assertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In
relation to the “second,” negative propo-
sition, the “dialectical moment” demands
the demonstration of “unity,” i.e., of
the connection of negative and positive,
the presence of this positive in the nega-
tive. From assertion to negation—from
negation to “unity” with the asserted—
without this dialectics becomes empty ne-
gation, a game, scepsis.)

... —“If then the negative, the deter-
minate, the relation, judgment, and all
determinations which fall under this sec-
ond moment, do not of themselves appear
as contradictory and dialectical, this is
a mere fault of thought which does not
confront its thoughts one with another.
For the materials—opposite determinations
in one relation—are posited already and
are at hand for thought. But formal thought
makes identity its law, and allows the
contradictory content which lies before it

to drop into the sphere of sensuous repre-
sentation, into space and time, where the
contradictory terms are held apart in spa-
tial and temporal juxtaposition and thus
come before consciousness without mu-
tual contact.” (342)

...“In this connection this thought^[75]
makes it its fixed principle that contradic-
tion is unthinkable; but in truth the think-
ing of contradiction is the essential mo-
ment of the Notion; in point of fact formal
thought does think contradiction, but im-
mediately disregards it, and with the asser-
tion of that principle” (the statement that
contradiction is unthinkable) “passes over
to abstract negation.” (342)

“The negativity which has just been
considered is the turning-point of the
movement of the Notion. It is the simple

point of negative self-relation, the inter-
nal source of all activity, vital and spirit-
ual self-movement, the dialectic soul which

all truth has in it and through which it

alone is truth; for the transcendence of
the opposition between the Notion and
Reality, and that unity which is the truth,
rest upon this subjectivity alone.—The
second negative, the negative of the neg-

ative, which we have reached, is this

transcendence of the contradiction, but is
no more the activity of an external reflec-
tion than the contradiction is; it is the in-
nermost and most objective moment of Life
and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject,
the person, the free, has being.” (342-343)

This negation of the negation is the
third term, says Hegel (343)—“if number
is applicable”—but it can also be taken
as the fourth (Quadruplicität^[77]), (344)
counting two negations: the “simple” (or
“formal”) and the “absolute.” (343 i.f.)

“That this unity, as well as the whole
form of the method, is a triplicity is wholly,
however, the merely superficial and ex-
ternal side of the manner of cognition” (344)

—but, he says, that is already “an infi-
nite merit of Kant’s philosophy” that it
at least (even if ohne Begriff^[78]) demon-
strated this.

“Formalists, it is true, have also seized
upon triplicity, and have held fast to its
empty framework; and this form has been
rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the
shallow misuse and the barrenness of mod-
ern so-called philosophic construction,
which consists simply in attaching the for-
mal framework without concept and im-
manent determination to all sorts of mat-
ter and employing it for external arrange-
ment. But its inner value cannot be dimin-
ished by this vapid misuse, and it must
still be deemed of high value that the out-
ward form of the rational has been dis-
covered, albeit not understood.” (344-345)

The result of the negation of the nega-

tion, this third term is “not a qui-
escent third term, but, as this unity”
(of contradictions), “is self-mediating
movement and activity....” (345)

The result of this dialectical transforma-
tion into the “third” term, into the synthe-
sis, is a new premise, assertion, etc., which
in turn becomes the source of a further
analysis. But into it, into this “third”
stage has already entered the “content”
of cognition (“the content of cognition as
such enters within the sphere of contempla-
tion”) — and the method is extended into
a system. (346)

The beginning of all consideration, of
the whole analysis—this first premise—
now appears indeterminate, “imperfect”;
the need arises to prove, “derive” (ablei-
ten) (347) it and it turns out that
“this may seem equivalent to the demand
for an infinite backward progress in proof and
derivation” (347)—but, on the other hand,
the new premise drives forward....

...“Thus, cognition rolls forward from con-
tent to content. This progress determines
itself, first, in this manner, that it be-
gins from simple determinatenesses and
that each subsequent one is richer and
more concrete. For the result contains its
own beginning, and the development of
the beginning has made it the richer by
a new determinateness. The universal is
the foundation; the progress therefore must
not be taken as a flow from Other to Other.
In the absolute method the Notion pre-
serves itself in its otherness, and the uni-
versal in its particularisation, in the Judg-
ment and in reality; it raises to each next
stage of determination the whole mass of
its antecedent content, and by its dialec-
tical progress not only loses nothing and
leaves nothing behind, but carries with
it all that it has acquired, enriching and
concentrating itself upon itself....” (349)

(This extract is not at all bad as a kind
of summing up of dialectics.)

But expansion requires also deepening

(“In-sich-gehen”^[79]) “ and greater extension
is also higher intensity.” (349)

“The richest consequently is also the
most concrete and subjective, and that
which carries itself back into the simplest
depth is also the most powerful and com-
prehensive.” (349)

“In this manner it comes about that each
step in the progress of further determi-
nation in advancing from the indetermi-
nate beginning is also a rearward approach
to it, so that two processes which may
at first appear to be different (the regres-
sive confirmation of the beginning and its
progressive further determination) coincide
and are the same.” (350)

It is impermissible deprezieren^[80] this
indeterminate beginning:

“It requires no apology that it”
(the beginning) “may be admitted mere-
ly as provisional and hypothetical. Any
objections which might be advanced—
about the limits of human cognition, or
the need of a critical investigation of the
instrument of cognition before the prob-
lem is attacked—are themselves supposi-

tions which, as concrete determinations,
imply the need for their mediation and
proof. Formally then they are no better
than that beginning against which they

protest, and rather require a derivation
by reason of their more concrete content; so
that it is sheer presumption to demand

that they should have preferential consid-
eration. Their content is untrue, for they

make incontrovertible and absolute what
is known to be finite and untrue (namely,

a restricted cognition which is determined
as form and instrument as against its

content); and this untrue cognition is it-
self form and regressive confirmation.—
The method of truth too knows the begin-
ning to be incomplete because it is be-
ginning, but also knows this incomplete
term in general as necessary, because truth
is only the coming to itself through the
negativity of immediacy....” (350-351)

...“By reason of the nature of the method
which has been demonstrated, science is
seen to be a circle which returns upon it-
self, for mediation bends back its end into
its beginning, simple ground. Further, this
circle is a circle of circles.... The various
sciences ... are fragments of this chain....”
(351)
     “The method is the pure Notion which
is related only to itself; it is therefore
the simple self-relation which is Being.
But now it is also Being fulfilled, the self-
comprehending Notion, Being as the con-
crete and also thoroughly intensive to-
tality....”(352)

...“Secondly, this Idea” ((die Idee des
absoluten Erkennens^[82])) “still is logical,
it is enveloped in pure thought, and is
the science only of the divine Notion.
The systematic development is itself a real-
isation, but is maintained within the
same sphere. Since the pure Idea of Cogni-
tion is to that extent enclosed in subjectiv-
ity, it is an impulse to transcend the latter,
and pure truth, as the last result, also

becomes the beginning of another sphere
and science. This transition need here only
be intimated.

“For the Idea posits itself as the abso-
lute unity of the pure Notion and its
Reality, and thus gathers itself into the
immediacy of Being; and in doing so,
as totality in this form, it is Nature.”
(352-353)

This sentence on the last (353) page of
the Logic is highly noteworthy. The tran-
sition of the logical idea to nature. It
brings one within a hand’s grasp of mate-
rialism. Engels was right^[83] when he said
that Hegel’s system was materialism turned
upside down. This is not the last sen-
tence of the Logic, but what comes after
it to the end of the page is unimportant.

End of the Logic. 17.XII.1914.

The Encyclopaedia § 227—excellent on
the analytical method (to “analyse” the
“Given concrete” phenomenon—“to give the

form of abstraction” to its individual
aspects and “herausheben” “to bring into
relief”—“the genus, or force and law”
p. 398—and on its application:

It is not at all “an arbitrary matter” (398)
whether we apply the analytical or the
synthetical method (as man pflegt zu sprech-
en^[88])—“it is the form of the very objects
that have to be cognised upon which it
depends” (399)

Locke and the empiricists adopt the
standpoint of analysis. And they often
say that “in general cognition cannot
do more.” (398)

“It is, however, at once apparent that

this turns things upside down, and that
cognition which wishes to take things as
they are thereby falls into contradiction
with itself.” The chemist, for example,
“martert”^[90] a piece of flesh and discovers

in it nitrogen, carbon, etc. “But then these
abstract substances have ceased to be
flesh.”

There can be many definitions, for ob-
jects have many aspects.

“The richer the object to be defined,
i.e., the more numerous the aspects which
it offers to one’s notice, the more various
also are the definitions framed from them”
(400 § 229)—for example, the definition
of life, of the state, etc.

In their definitions, Spinoza and Schel-
ling present a mass of “speculation” (Hegel
here obviously uses this word in the good
sense) but “in the form of assurances.”
Philosophy, however, must prove and de-
rive everything, and not limit itself to
definitions.

Division (Einteilung) must be “natural
and not merely artificial, i.e., arbitrary.”
(401)

Pp. 403-404— anger at “construction”
and the “play” of construing, whereas it
is a question of the Begriff, the “Idee,” of “Ein-
heit des Begriffs und der Objektivität....”^[91]
(403)

In the small Encyclopaedia § 233,
section b is entitled das Wollen^[92]
(which in the large Logic is “Die Idee des
Guten”^[93]).

Activity is a “contradiction”—the pur-
pose is real and not real, possible and
not ... etc.

“Formally, however, the disappearance
of this contradiction consists in activity
abolishing the subjectivity of the pur-
pose and along with it the objectivity,
the opposite, in virtue of which both
are finite, and abolishing not merely the
one-sidedness of this subjectivity, but the
subjectivity as a whole” (406).

The standpoint of Kant and Fichte (es-
pecially in moral philosophy) is the stand-
point of purpose, of subjective ought (407)
(without connection with the objective)....

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegel
ridicules (§ 237, Vol. VI, p. 409) “decla-
mation” over it, as if everything were
revealed in it, and he remarks that
     “the absolute idea” ... is ... “the univer-
sal,” “but the universal not merely as ab-
stract form, to which (sic!) the particular
content stands contrasted as an Other,

but as the absolute form into which all
determinations, the whole fullness of the
content posited by it, have retreated. In
this respect the absolute idea can be com-
pared to an old man, who utters the same
statements of religion as a child, but for
whom they have the significance of his
whole lifetime. Even if the child under-
stands the religious content, it is for him
still only something outside of which the
whole of life and the whole of the world
lie.” (410)

...“The interest lies in the whole move-
ment....” (§ 237, 409)

...“The content is the living develop-
ment of the idea....” “Each of the stages
hitherto reviewed is an image of the ab-
solute, but at first in a limited way....”
(401)

§ 238 Addendum:
     “The philosophical method is both ana-
lytical and synthetical, but not in the
sense of a bare juxtaposition or a mere
alternation of these two methods of finite
cognition, but rather in such a way that
it holds them transcended in itself, and

in everyone of its movements, there-
fore, it proves itself simultaneously ana-
lytical and synthetical. Philosophical

thought proceeds analytically, insofar as it

only accepts its object, the Idea, allows
the latter its own way and, as it were,
only looks on at its movement and de-
velopment. To this extent philosophising
is wholly passive. Philosophic thought,

however, is equally synthetic and shows
itself to be the activity of the Notion itself.
That, however, involves the effort to re-
frain from our own fancies and private
opinions, which always seek to obtrude
themselves....” (411)

(§ 243, p. 413)... “Thus the method is
not an external form, but the soul and
notion of the content....”

(End of the Encyclopaedia; see above
on the side the extract from the end of Log-
ic.^[94])