Misrepresented? Hugo Chávez
and the Western Media
By Robert Looby
How will Putin's Russia fare if and when oil and gas prices fall?
How much of Tony Blair's talk about a 'third way' in politics was
empty populism? How serious is de Villepin's commitment to eradicating
poverty? How much of Zapatero's popularity can be attributed to
anti-Americanism? Are the New York Times and other newspapers
biased against Bush? Given the controversey over his election in
2000, can we trust George W Bush's democratic credentials? How dangerous
is downtown LA after dark?
If you throw enough mud, some of it will stick, and so I find myself
putting the above questions to Dr. Julia Buxton, Senior Research
Fellow at Centre for International Cooperation and Security, in
the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University. However, the
subject of our interview is not Putin, Blair or Bush, but Hugo Chávez,
president of Venezuela, and target of concerted criticism in the
western media. The labels attached to Chávez usually concentrate
on his 'populism' or 'anti-Americanism' but Dr Buxton argues that
Chávez is in fact a pragmatist, who came to power preaching
something like a 'third way' and whose country continues to enjoy
strong ties with the US.
Dr Buxton has been to Venezuela many times, studying Venezuelan
politics and doing fieldwork in the country. She has also been there
as an election observer, to lecture, for conferences and for research
purposes. She kindly agreed to be interviewed by Three Monkeys Online.
How is Chávez viewed in South America,
Latin America and Mexico?
In the absence of cross-regional opinion polls I am limited to
conjecture in responding to this, but here are a few observations.
I think that there is sympathy, if not support for Chávez
among ordinary South American people in countries like Brazil, Peru,
Mexico and Colombia. Because Chávez has directly addressed
the needs of the poor through his Missions programs he is one of
the few leaders and politicians on the Continent who is identified
with pro-poor causes, even more so given his commitment to rolling
these social and welfare initiatives out into other South and Central
American states. His powerful anti-neoliberal rhetoric and criticism
of the Bush administration (which is deeply unpopular for a variety
of reasons across the region) has also made him something of a hero
to those that feel neglected and marginalised by mainstream politics
and free market agendas.
How genuine is his commitment to the Missions programme? What
are conditions like on the ground in Venezuela? Has Chávez
really addressed the needs of the poor?
Yes, I think he has, in two senses. Firstly economic: the Chávez
government has reoriented the established patterns of government
spending, which for decades were concentrated and focused on the
wealthier sectors of society (largely through tax breaks, subsidies
and universal subsidies that disproportionately benefited wealthier
groups – as with petroleum, education and medicines). By radically
altering established patterns of public spending in favour of marginalised
groups (reinforced by the introduction of income tax) and investing
in areas that enhance social capital (education, health, housing,
land distribution, credit availability) the government has addressed
the needs of the poor. The problem is if current strategies are
sustainable – if oil prices dip, then the development model
(which already has a number of contradictions) cannot be maintained.
The commitment to the missions programme is, in my view, irrefutable.
These social policy projects only developed after 2003 (after the
defeat of the opposition post the 2002 coup and the strong rise
in the oil price). I think the commitment stems more from a nationalist
integrationist focused project rather than a commitment to 'socialism'.
We have had over 2,000 schools built, 8,000 clinics, 20,000 Cuban
doctors brought in, 1.5 million people reincorporated back into
education – these kinds of policies are essential if Venezuela's
tragic economic and social under-development is to be overcome.
Chávez has also addressed the needs of the poor in a political
sense. In this respect he has brought into the political process
and empowered people that were marginalised and excluded from mainstream
politics – people whose needs and demand for representation
were ignored. The challenge now is to allow this new model of representation
to develop autonomously, without people being tied to the Chavista
movement through clientelist or other means. My honest view is that
things on the ground have improved dramatically and significantly:
you can see the changes and the impact of the changes on the lives
of the poorest. But, as I say, the key is sustainability, accountability
in delivery and equity in access.
As for his popularity at the elite level, regional heads of state
also seem to be sympathetic to Chávez – for two primary
reasons. Firstly Chávez is recognised as democratically elected
and – interlinked with this – there is strong opposition
to any actions that violate the sovereignty of individual states.
This is a powerful sentiment in South America and, as a result,
there is some anger with the US for its clumsy diplomacy and intervention
in Venezuela's domestic affairs.
Much has been made of the friction between Chávez and, for
example, President Lula of Brazil. I think these tensions have been
exaggerated. Rather than berating Chávez, there appears to
be a regional consensus that Venezuela should not be 'satanized'.
This came across quite clearly in recent statements by the current
and former president's of Chile – a country that the US has
sought to cultivate against Chávez. The right wing in South
America has always been politically, ideologically and electorally
weak, so there has not been a large-scale mobilisation against Chávez
led by right of centre individuals. It should also be noted that
Chávez is tremendously pragmatic, as underscored by his close
relations with President Uribe of Colombia, arguably the most right-wing
president in the region. The majority of South American presidents
also understand that Chávez is a specific product of the
political and economic under-development of Venezuela – as
such, the reach of his Boliviarian revolution is rather constrained.
Clearly the enormous wealth generated by the oil price highs has
provided Chávez with fiscal leverage and influence, in turn
causing some regional concern as to how transparently the Venezuelan
government handles its resources.
However, there is a potential risk of 'overstretch' by Chávez
in two respects. Firstly, Chávez must respect principles
of state sovereignty and not be too incautious in expressing his
support for candidates in upcoming regional elections (Nicaragua
and Mexico) – as he did for the (defeated) candidate in the
recent Peruvian elections, Ollanta Humala. This type of intervention
is unwelcome and could backfire on the Venezuelan government. Secondly,
Venezuela must understand that other South and Central American
countries are not positioned to challenge the US in the same way
that Venezuela has been able to. Venezuela's decision to pull out
of the Community of Andean Nations following the move by Peru and
Colombia to sign bilateral free trade agreements with the US was
a demonstration of Venezuela's commitment to an alternative model
of regional economic integration. But in presenting neighbours with
a black and white, us or the US option, Chávez runs the risk
of polarising relations in the region and forcing neighbouring countries
into more politically flexible accords with the USA.
How is Chávez viewed in the west?
As in South America there is a division between opinions at the
grassroots and among the elite – although in the West, these
are probably more pronounced. Developments in Venezuela have catalysed
the emergence of solidarity groups from London to Vienna, San Francisco
to Paris. These incorporate anti-war groups, trade unions, student
organisations, fringe left of centre parties, anti-globalisation
activists and ordinary 'democrats' angered by the provocative interventions
by the US and the failure of the Bush administration to recognise
the democratic legitimacy of the Chávez administration. Venezuela
has served as a mechanism for introducing a whole new generation
to political activism. At the elite level, the UK has followed the
US in assuming a jaundiced view of Chávez, although it has
been more diplomatic in its posturing – bar some unfortunate
statements from the Prime Minister. Spain, France and Italy have
been more pragmatic, but within the EU, they face pressure from
some of the Central European countries that have adopted a strong
“human rights” position on Cuba (Fidel Castro not Guantanamo
Bay!). The right wing is more powerful in Europe than South America,
and as a result, we have had a more critical stance adopted by some
Christian Democrat and Conservative Parties from EU countries. Unfortunately,
many come to the debate without really understanding the political
and economic history and context of Venezuelan politics. There are
clearly concerns as to energy security over the longer term, but
this requires more effective engagement by the EU countries, rather
than the blind assumption of a critical position. The great irony
in all of this is that on the whole, EU based business and investment
interests have been 'context' sensitive from the start and have
acknowledged both the legitimacy and the pro-poor agenda of the
Venezuela administration.
The US is of course a different situation. In relation to Venezuela,
I would say that the US has been inept, clumsy, bellicose and anachronistic
in its response to Chávez. I would further argue that the
US has transformed Chávez into a greater perceived 'threat'
to US interests then Chávez was when he came to power, as
a moderate advocate of third way economics, in 1999. The US has
sought to interpret Venezuela through the lens of the Cold War overlaid
with its new 'long war' against terrorism. It pursued a dreadfully
misconceived approach when it channelled money to the anti-Chávez
movement (it weakened rather than strengthened them) and statements
condoning the coup of 2002 angered regional neighbours in addition
to being a highly undemocratic response. US diplomacy has been inept
and short-sighted and until the US accepts and comes to terms with
the deep resentment toward perceived American imperialism, not only
in Venezuela, but across the region, it will find it difficult to
claw back any popularity or respect.
Do you think the western media is biased against Chávez
and if so, why?
Yes, for several reasons. Firstly, a large number of Western media
commentators feel that they have 'seen this all before' with Chile
(Salvador Allende) and Argentina (Juan Peron). This has led them
to rely (lazily) on old concepts – such as the vacuous notion
of populism – and old debates. In this respect, they have come
to the issue of Venezuela with established preconceptions about
left of centre politics in South America. Interlinked with this,
there is, I think, an element of racism and elitism. Because Chávez
is 'of the people' and not a regular fixture on the cocktail circuits,
many journalists do not really know how to interpret him –
other than through tried, tested and usually irrelevant ideas and
references. Further to this, some influential journalists have gone
through an ideological rebirth over the past few decades and have
moved from a position on the far left to one on the pro neo-con,
neo-liberal right. I am thinking about the Economist, the
FT etc here. Having recanted their earlier beliefs, they
are disparaging toward any attempt to re-establish socialism or
any other form of anti-neoliberal agendas. Those in the media that
have no roots in South American politics or left wing politics have
been reluctant to overcome their ignorance and have produced misinformed
and factually incorrect reports and analyses of developments in
Venezuela. We saw that very much in evidence during Chávez’s
visit to the UK – perhaps best exemplified by the Independent
newspaper. So it is a mixture of a number of things – laziness,
ignorance, journalism on a shoe string. Finally, investigative journalism
is not very strong. Too many media commentators provide a 'Hilton'
hotel view of events and never venture into the slums – where
Chávez’s programs and support are concentrated.
In an editorial the Guardian attributed most of his popularity
in Europe to anti-Americanism ("my enemy's friend is my friend”).
Would you agree?
No, not at all. People are interested in Venezuela, and Chávez
is popular, for a host of reasons other than his anti-Americanism
– which most people fail to recognise is pragmatic and underlined
by continued strong bilateral economic ties between Venezuela and
the US. America is currently deeply unpopular because it lied about
WMD in Iraq, it acted without the consent of the UN when it invaded
Iraq, it sought to censor and control media coverage of US operations
in Iraq and it has committed terrible human rights abuses in the
course of building 'democracy' in Iraq. And of course, there is
also the view that the invasion was motivated by the US pursuit
of Iraqi oil reserves. People who back Chávez do so because
they do not believe what the US really says anymore – nor do
they think the US has the legitimacy to pontificate about democracy,
human rights or international law. People defend Venezuela because
they do not want another pre-emptive strike on another oil producer
justified through untruths and disinformation. Chávez is
a democratically elected head of state, who, for the first time
in contemporary South American politics, has challenged the hegemony
of the US and neo-liberalism. He has been outspoken in his criticism
of the Iraqi war and other facile and destructive elements of US
foreign policy – Colombia, the 'war on drugs', Iran, Guatanamo
Bay – among others. In the absence of European heads of state
prepared to constructively criticise the US and reign back the most
destructive and authoritarian strands of the country’s foreign
policy, Chávez is a hero.
You describe populism as a vacuous notion. If Chávez is
not a populist, what is he? You mention the "third way."
Does (or did) Chávez resemble Tony Blair and New Labour (past
or present; actual or stated)?
I do not like the term populist because it is meaningless. It is
used by people who like to gloss over (or do not know / appreciate)
the more complex dynamics that underpin a given administration.
Populism also implies that supporters of the 'populist' are somehow
irrational. I do not think this is the case in Venezuela –
yes Chávez came out of a vacuum of political organisation
and yes he is the central figure in the administration – but
the more complex reality is that popular organisations and grassroots
groups have more political capacity, dynamism and influence than
is thought, the Chávez government contains strong and influential
figures – and the military remain important actors. What I
am saying is that Chávez is far weaker, more accountable
to different groups and in a more fragile position than is assumed
when people read the word 'populist'.
So what is he? Depends what week or year we are talking about.
He is a chameleon, a pragmatist, a man who absorbs new ideas, moves
to craft new political alliances and who understands the mobilisational
power of anti-American sentiment and demands for justice. He was
initially elected professing a Third Way model - in which the state
would compensate for the failings of the market. However, the rise
of the oil price and the behaviour of foreign and domestic capital
sectors have convinced him that Third Way economics cannot work.
I expect that a dramatic plunge in the oil price might force him
to revert back to the Third Way!
The economy of Venezuela shrank in 2002 and 2003 quite drastically.
How did Chávez hold on to power in the circumstances?
He held on to power because he was widely supported. Chávez
was elected after decades of misgovernment by profoundly unpopular
and corrupt political parties – AD and COPEI. They ran the
country and the economy into the ground. Chávez enjoyed a
long honeymoon period (from 1999 onwards), and this was enhanced
following the opposition protests (which gained pace after 2001)
– which despite the appearance at the time, lacked massive
public support. When the economy dipped catastrophically, people
identified the economic contraction with the opposition. It was
their strategies of lock-outs, non-payment of taxes, capital flight
and paralysing the oil sector that caused the economic deterioration
and this was recognised by the majority of people – who were
Chávez supporters. Moreover I think people who had been wavering
about Chávez – particularly poor people – saw the
regressive and undemocratic actions and characteristics of the opposition
and came to the conclusion they were better off with Chávez.
The economy boomed in 2004 and 2005. How much is due to oil?
Does this mean that Chávez's position (and his social programmes)
is precarious in that it is overdependent on one source of income?
Yes absolutely. Strong growth driven by rising oil export revenues
and high levels of government spending. Non-oil taxation has improved,
but overall, the government remains dependent on oil for the bulk
of its revenues – if anything oil 'dependence' has deepened
under Chávez, despite commitments in 1998 to diversify the
economic base. So, yes, the funding basis of the social programmes
is precarious.
Chávez attempted a coup once. Is the US not right, then,
to regard him with suspicion?
There are a couple of issues here. Firstly – yes the coup
went against “international democratic norms,” but there
was a very serious underlying issue about the use of violence by
the Andres Perez government during the Caracazo of 1989 in addition
to generalised problems of exclusion and lack of representation.
The Venezuelan state was using violence and brutality against its
own citizens and in many respects, this brought an inevitable response
from the military, which was used by Andres Perez in 1989 to put
down protests. So, if you have a situation where political grievances
cannot be channelled or addressed peacefully, non-traditional actors
/ approaches do come to the fore. Secondly, we live in a world where
pragmatic choices are routinely made in the interests of stability.
The US could have used its diplomacy more effectively and rather
than reacting negatively to Chávez because of his involvement
in the coup, a more refined and 'soft' approach could have been
pursued. I think this is particularly the case given that Chávez
served time in prison for the coup and that he subsequently opted
to pursue power through the ballot box. Finally, and linking back
to the point about pragmatism, the US has shown itself capable of
dealing with military figures who have seized power, carried out
coups etc – Pakistan being the most obvious example.
What are the Tascon and Maisanta lists?
In sum – very unfortunate and regrettable developments. Essentially
Tascon was a list of those people that had voted for Chávez
to step down in the August 2005 recall referendum. Luis Tascon,
a Chavista deputy then took the appalling step of posting this on
his website so that anti-Chavistas could be identified. The logic
then – as with the Maisanta list, is that anti-Chavistas are
known. It was subsequently claimed that the list was used to deny
people employment in the public sector etc. It was regrettable that
Tascon was not punished and that the government did not take this
gross violation of election information more seriously.
How dangerous is, for example, downtown Caracas?
After dark – very dangerous. Venezuela has one of the highest
murder rates in the world, ahead of Colombia and Afghanistan. The
main victims of violence are young men – and they are also
the main perpetrators. Speed knapping at cashpoints is also a major
problem. Insecurity has been a problem in the country since the
late 1980s. No government has developed an effective security plan
– a problem exacerbated by the fact that the police force and
security sector are under fragmented lines of institutional responsibility
– more so since decentralization in the early 1990s.
How oppressive is life in Venezuela for opponents of Chávez?
Film maker Jonathan Jakubowicz is being prosecuted for insulting
him.
It is a controversial topic, but my own view remains that opponents
of Chávez drastically abused the freedom and privileges enjoyed
by the private sector media and press liberty in Venezuela to attack
the government and destabilise the country. This brought an inevitable
reaction from the Chávez government but again, I think the
idea that the opposition have been gagged and face serious threats
to their freedoms is overexaggerated. The press remains lively and
criticism and censorship remains far below that exercised in, for
example, the US or the UK. In terms of the film you mention, I think
the government has over-reacted. The film creates more questions
about inequality and poverty than it answers and if anything, it
justifies the social programmes introduced by the government. There
is a more serious question underlying all of this, which is how
can both the government and its opponents create space for tolerance
and pluralism?
Is Chávez attacking property rights?
The administration was committed to property rights but appeared
to renege on this when a series of land takeovers in agricultural
was authorised. There is a serious issue about the legality and
justice of current landholding structures in the country. With 70%
of agricultural lands controlled by just 3% of proprietors there
is a serious issue of equity, development and distribution. The
need to redistribute land is unquestionable, the key issue is if
the government is executing land reform in a legal and fair way
that is within the due process of law. So I think if a person, family
or company has legal ownership, then property rights have not been
questioned. The problem, as we have seen, is when the legality of
the property rights are non-existent, non-contract based and not
provable.
Does Chávez control the public media? Can the bias of
the privately owned media against him justify government control
of the public media?
There needs to be a sense of perspective on this. The public media
is a miniscule share of overall media output – not even in
double figures yet as far as I am aware. I do not think Chávez
"controls" it per se. Clearly it reflects a government
position (as the public sector media in many countries tends to
do) but community groups (which now have a key role in providing
output) are not as 'controllable' as may be thought and they have
been very active in developing independent output. I will try and
send you a good research paper on this by Naomi Schiller in the
US. It goes back to the points made in the last set of questions,
the whole idea that Chávez controls everything neglects the
more complex reality – public sector broadcasting and TV production
is far more dynamic and independent than thought. As this does not
fit with pre-conceived ideas of Chávez, this reality tends
to be ignored.
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